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Very often scholarly anthologies, whether the essays have been com-
missioned to address a common theme or have originated as papers at 
a scholarly conference, are uneven in quality.1 Some may stray far 
from the theme while others focus on a very narrow aspect of it, in the 
first case diluting it too much, in the second ignoring the broader as-
pects. Or one essay may build a theoretical argument resting on thin 
evidence, while another deploys a large collection of empirical data 
with little conceptual framework or interpretive comment. The chap-
ters may not cohere as a group, leaving the impression of intellectual 
dispersion, or they may cohere too much, coming together in a lump 
in which lines of inquiry blur and original findings are lost in a jumble 
of repetition and overlap. None of this is the case with the present 
volume; there are no weak essays, and the interested reader can learn 
much from them all about commerce and the social networks that 
sustained it in the early modern Iberian Atlantic world. Apart from 
their sustained high quality and the depth of the research upon which 
they rest, the chapters cover three centuries (although with the excep-
tion of the essay by Cachero Vinuesa they emphasize the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries) and embrace an enormous geographic area 
including Spain, Europe more broadly, the Atlantic Basin, Central 
America, Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico. Furthermore, a number of differ-
ent methodologies are represented, ranging from general treatments of 
large areas to case studies of firms, families, and individuals. It has 
been a privilege to read these essays closely, and even an apostate 
from economic history such as I can learn much from them.  
                                                     
1  This essay is based in part upon an unpublished commentary prepared for the 
economic history conference at Helsinki in 2006 at which several of the essays 
included here were originally delivered; and upon remarks prepared for a presen-
tation of the book Redes sociales e instituciones comerciales en el imperio espa-
ñol, siglos XVII a XIX coordinated by Antonio Ibarra and Guillermina del Valle 
Pavón (2007), at the Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora in 
Mexico City, September 26, 2008. 
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As a group of essays, moreover, the books tone is very coherent, 
so that the chapters illuminate each other mutually in fruitful ways, 
mainly due to two frameworks employed by the authors. First, the 
chapters certainly all deal with the Iberian Atlantic during the period 
in which the Atlantic world acquired its economic, geopolitical, and 
even to some degree its cultural identity. This was due chiefly to the 
imperial projects of Spain, Portugal, and Britain (and to a lesser de-
gree of France and the Netherlands), the exchange of New World 
commodities for Old World products within a colonial and mercantil-
ist framework, and the transatlantic trade in African slaves to produce 
those same commodities.2 A second theme that binds the essays to-
gether is the reliance of most of them on the concept of the social 
network as a basis for commercial exchanges over long distances, 
and in unreliable markets and informational environments. The credit 
relationships that sustained these trading patterns were often stretched 
quite thin, found themselves subject to the accidents of international 
trade in a pre-modern technological setting, and were highly vulner-
able to predation from pirates, interloping colonial competitors, or 
even the governments of the colonial metropolis. Social networks 
based on business interests, and arising from and/or reinforced by 
elective affinities based upon common geographical origins, religious 
confession, linguistic community, kinship, and other factors func-
tioned to soften these problems and reduce risks. In the first part of my 
commentary I offer some observations on several of the individual 
essays, chiefly with reference to the concept and historical reality of 
the social network in the context of the early modern world, between 
about 1500 and 1850 or so. Although valuable contributions in eco-
nomic history in their own terms, two of the essays in the collection  
 those of Lenk and Böttcher  have little to say about networks as 
such, and are therefore not discussed in this essay. Others of the au-
thors  Crespo Solana, Álvarez, Freire Costa and Rocha, del Valle 
                                                     
2  Atlantic studies and Atlantic history have become quite fashionable among 
historical disciplines in the United States in recent years, with university courses, 
conferences, publications, and even academic research/teaching positions de-
voted to them in a number of institutions. My own view is that this large concep-
tion of an Atlantic Basin history holds up reasonably well for the period up to 
about 1850 or so, but begins to break down with the abolition of the African 
slave trade and the abolition of slavery in the tropical lowland areas of the West-
ern Hemisphere.  
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Pavón, and Suárez Argüello  have made equally interesting contribu-
tions, but do discuss (especially merchant) social networks in an em-
pirical context, and so come in for some discussion here. The two 
essays that address themselves explicitly to the more theoretical or 
conceptual aspects of social networks are those of Cachero Vinuesa 
and Hausberger. The first I discuss in the next section, while the sec-
ond comes in for some comment along with the other chapters, but 
also serves as a sort of springboard for my musings on social networks 
in the final section of the essay. Insofar as the individual chapters are 
concerned, I will not attempt to synthesize their findings, nor to offer 
an extended critique of their methods, but simply offer some observa-
tions to extend the essays meaning a bit. When I pass on to a more 
general discussion of social networks in the latter part of the commen-
tary, I will not presume to characterize my remarks as theoretical, if 
only because as a historian I am not particularly theoretical in my own 
approach to the writing of history. Nor are my points especially origi-
nal, and still less do I claim to offer a model that can embrace all the 
processes implied by the concept of the network. But unless I am mis-
taken in my reading of these fine essays, I have detected a certain 
absence, with the two exceptions of the contributions by Cachero 
Vinuesa and volume co-editor Hausberger, of this sort of conceptual 
discussion, and a tendency to take as a given the idea of social net-
works; it is that absence I wish to fill in some degree. 
 
1. The Essays 
Montserrat Cachero Vinuesas essay, as I noted above, is one of the 
few chapters in the book that deals in an explicitly theoretical way 
with the concept of social networks, and in fact begins with a very 
robust theoretical discussion taking up several pages. So it will per-
haps be useful to highlight some of the more general points in her 
paper as a basis for some of what follows in the rest of the book. She 
writes that networks are un elemento imprescindible para el análisis 
de la actividad económica en cualquier época y lugar, an assertion 
with which all the authors in this volume (and those in other recent 
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works) would readily agree.3 Furthermore, almost all the essays dem-
onstrate empirically, and Hausberger discusses on a conceptual level, 
what Cachero Vinuesa emphasizes: that reliable information is the key 
good to be had from networks. In fact, Cachero describes the economy 
generally as a sistema de información. While I might reduce the 
expansiveness of this statement to apply to the market as a mediator 
of the economy, rather than to the economy as a whole (the economy 
does produce things, after all  arrobas of chocolate, ingots of sil-
ver, cattle hides, and so forth), this is a sort of theoretical quibble that 
by no means invalidates her general point. Cachero goes on shrewdly 
to enumerate the costs of acquiring information  the energy involved 
in observation, communication, memory or storage of information (is 
there a business archive?; how much correspondence is involved in a 
business transaction?), recovery and processing of data  as an over-
head expense in commercial dealings, although she does not explore 
the implications of this. Presumably the metric to be applied here 
would be whether the sum of the opportunity cost of remaining out-
side a social network, plus the direct energy investment involved in 
getting information, is outweighed by the monetized value gained 
from the reliability of the information and the advantages it confers in 
dealings with other economic agents. Cachero Vinuesa emphasizes the 
utility of networks in reducing risk through the acquisition of such 
information, and therefore in allowing control of the optimal level of 
investment, especially in situations with a high degree of incertitude, 
such as the carrera de Indias in the very early period. 
The heart of her discussion is the perception that lazos person-
ales contributed powerfully to the constitution of networks among 
merchants, whose principal function was to reduce risk, although it 
could hardly be eliminated entirely. At the heart of these personal 
bonds, in turn, was confianza, although she emphasizes the volatile, 
unstable nature of networks built even (or especially) on personal 
bonds. As do Hausberger and several of the other authors, Cachero 
notes that networks were most often built not exclusively upon mutual 
economic interest, but also upon kinship, friendship, common geo-
                                                     
3  See the volume coordinated by Ibarra/Valle Pavón (2007); see also the journal 
Historia Mexicana, 56, 2=223, a dedicated volume about Redes sociales e insti-
tuciones, coordinated by Antonio Ibarra and Guillermina del Valle Pavón.  
Social Networks: A Final Comment 293
graphic origins, and other forms of affinity, and that where several of 
these elements overlapped, the network was strongest and most resil-
ient. This was the case with her burgaleses, judeoconversos, and mer-
caderes, who thus shared an occupational culture, mutual economic 
interest, geographic origin, religious orientation, and perhaps a degree 
of social marginality that in itself may have strengthened group soli-
darity (something we shall see again in the Crespo Solana essay). She 
also explores the importance of the hombre de confianza, citing as 
synonymous with this the functional designations of criado and 
mayordomo. Here we run into a bit of conceptual difficulty, it 
seems to me, since such men would be employees of a merchant or 
other more or less autonomous economic actor, which reduces the 
element of reciprocity as the basis for relations within a network, as I 
will have occasion to point out in the final section of this essay. Still, 
reciprocity can exist within the context of a partnership among struc-
turally equivalent parties whose contributions to the common enter-
prise of the network need not be symmetrical. This is illustrated nicely 
by a commercial partnership she describes, formed in Seville in 1520, 
in which the two participants were what she calls a socio-capitalista 
and a socio-factor, the first contributing capital, the second his labor 
and managerial skills, a form of business enterprise common in the 
Hispanic world (and beyond it) for centuries. 
Ana Crespo Solanas interesting essay on Dutch merchant net-
works in the Atlantic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
deploys a number of useful findings and raises at least three points 
about social networks worth bringing to the foreground. First, she 
notes the central importance of Dutch and Flemish traders, and espe-
cially of Jews, in the trade to the New World ports. This echoes the 
findings of Cachero Vinuesa and suggests yet again that merchant 
networks might well be based upon a degree of social exclusion and 
religious marginality that produced the intra-group solidarity on which 
network formation was based. Networks, then, were as much about 
exclusion  in this case, defensive exclusion based on a series of 
shared, mutually reinforcing characteristics  as they were about in-
clusion or containment (of information and confidence). Second, Cres-
pos concentration on the great Spanish port city of Cádiz reminds us 
that such networks existed not only in relational terms, in the abstract 
geometry of reciprocity and articulation, but also in spatial ones. They 
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often centered on real geographic nodes of interaction  Cádiz, Ve-
racruz, Havana, Portobelo, Buenos Aires, etc.  that might condition 
their spatial reach and shape the possibilities of membership. Third, 
she points out that the immigration process can be framed within a 
social context where single, young men born in families of traders and 
seamen would temporarily leave their homes to become incorporated 
into social networks, as young men around the Atlantic rim (and else-
where) had done for millennia (Vickers/Walsh (2005). Should they 
last more than a decade or so, networks might well have an inter-
generational dimension in which the structure of the network was 
renewed by men moving through the lifecycle. At the very least they 
would advance from being subordinate, younger members of a net-
work to the status of senior members, and then possibly move out of 
the network as they reached their later years. This is not an aspect of 
social networks much discussed by the authors in this volume, but is 
worth thinking about in terms of the social reproduction of such 
groupings (their ability to recruit younger members or to expand hori-
zontally to an optimal size) and the age-related patterns of accumula-
tion of social capital within them (the contacts and experience that 
presumably increased with age and success in trade). As individuals 
passed through the network over a number of years, and as their sons 
were born into it, there might also be an acculturation process under-
gone by its members, as where Crespo mentions that second- and 
third-generation Flemish and Dutch traders became completely Span-
ish, something that proved an advantage to them and their relatives 
trading firms. 
The very rich paper of Carlos Álvarez centers on the question of 
whether the mercantile exchanges at the Portobelo fair were organized 
through impersonal market forces or personalized network relation-
ships. In terms of the actors he describes, he puts it this way:  
Una de las decisiones más importantes de un comerciante consistía en 
decidir si utilizaba el Mercado para llevar a cabo una determinada tran-
sacción o, por el contrario, recurría a la relación personal en un contrato 
de cooperación permanente con otro agente. La menor o mayor confianza 
a la hora de recurrir al Mercado dependería del coste que tenía para los 
agentes económicos acudir a él. 
This seems to me too stark a portrayal of the decision-making process, 
and I would suggest that it might usefully be subjected to a number of 
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qualifications. First, there was really no such thing as a free market 
under mercantilist assumptions, since buying and selling took place 
under a number of constraints that worked to distort market transac-
tions, as Álvarez himself ably demonstrates, although everyone except 
contrabandistas worked under the same constraints. For example, the 
Spanish consulado maintained the right to determine and limit the 
tonnage of the goods being shipped in any given flota. Second, one 
doubts if there was such a rational, black-and-white distinction be-
tween modes of exchange in the minds of traders, but perhaps more of 
a continuum of practices moving from the more to the less personal-
ized. Third, even assuming that two such clear alternatives did exist, 
and that they were conceptually distinct in the minds of the actors, it 
would be the case that unless everyone used the market organization, 
there would be little inducement for anyone to rely on market mecha-
nisms as opposed to personal networks, especially in high-risk situa-
tions, even should the transaction or opportunity costs of relying on 
the personal network prove higher. Fourth, we sometimes forget (and 
Álvarez himself does not factor this into his account) the nature of the 
market in which such merchants were entering: its relative shallow-
ness and relatively low levels of disposable income on the part of the 
potential ultimate consumers, especially after the markups imposed by 
shipping costs, insurance, taxation, and profit margins. The low dis-
posable income levels would have tended to make economies of scale 
in trade less possible, and would tilt the trade toward goods which 
could sustain high, even non-competitive prices, which is in fact what 
happened, as I understand it. Álvarez finds, essentially, that the expen-
sive distortions introduced into the market by the use of personal net-
works were to some degree counterbalanced by the security of having 
exchanges take place at all. 
The social and cultural integration of networked merchant groups 
into their host communities illustrated by Crespo Solana comes up 
again in the treatment of the Brazilian gold traded offered by Leonor 
Freire Costa and Maria Manuela Rocha. The authors point to the ac-
commodation that foreign traders were able to achieve in their diaspo-
ras, much as Cachero Vinuesa has done in the case of Sevilla and Cre-
spo Solana in that of Cádiz. In describing the English in relation to the 
Portuguese, however, the authors point interestingly both to the limits 
of such accommodation and to the differences in national business 
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cultures that supported group solidarities and exclusions. They note 
that the Portuguese had a number of habits in business relationships 
considered insupportable by foreigners dealing with them, which 
raises the generally fascinating issue of the incommensurability of 
business practices between Mediterranean and Northern European 
traders. The Portuguese traders, they point out, liked to talk with one 
another and the English to get down to business immediately. In doing 
this, the Portuguese were piling up social capital and knowledge 
capital in ways alien to the English model, so that one might almost 
call the Portuguese network a socialized one and the English net-
work a monetized one. They go on to discuss Englishness as a con-
fidence-inducing quality among English merchants that had little to do 
with the short-term rationalities of trading, and much to do with the 
more elusive values of trust and reputation. They imply, therefore, that 
trust had to do not only with business practices themselves, but also 
with in-group/out-group relationships  with boundaries and exclu-
sions, in other words. They thus illustrate that cultural and ethnic iden-
tity can reinforce bonds of trust, while also pointing to the more obvi-
ous linkages forged within such diasporic communities by marriage 
choice as a form of self-segregation.  
The rich conceptual discussion of Bernd Hausberger of social 
networks and merchants I have mostly incorporated into the conclud-
ing section of this essay, as I have mentioned above. Aside from a 
summary and analysis of his interesting empirical materials, however, 
which I am not prepared to offer here (the possible implications of the 
fact, for example, that his merchant protagonist Tomás Ruiz de Apo-
daca was the father of Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, Conde del Venadito, 
viceroy of Mexico between 1816 and 1821, and implacable foe of the 
Mexican insurgents), there are some worthwhile points to highlight. 
Hausberger points out that a counterweight to seeing networks in the 
rather impersonal, abstract terms of social organization is to subject 
them to Geertzian thick description and microhistorical examination 
(which most of the authors in this volume do very adeptly). He further 
advocates analyzing them in terms of actual social practice  that is, 
descriptions of day-to-day, even moment-to-moment improvisation, 
albeit within the framework of established cultural expectations.4 
                                                     
4  On practice theory, see Ortner (2006). 
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While many of the authors demonstrate it empirically and implicitly, 
Hausberger asserts conceptually and explicity that culture is really the 
shared bedrock of such arrangements. He goes on to state that the 
function of rules and shared values in such arrangements was to limit 
to a minimum the conflicts that threatened to damage the bonds of 
solidarity that produced cohesion in networks. Yet one wonders if this 
formulation should not, in fact, be turned on its head, since networks 
seem to have existed to minimize conflict inherent in the social and 
business environment. Hausbergers essay raises some other interest-
ing questions in passing: whether a dyadic arrangement (exemplified 
by the 1759 deal between Ruiz de Apodaca and Andrés de Loyo y 
Treviño) can be a network; the degree to which established networks 
were imperiled by opportunistic practice (the refusal of Ruiz de Apo-
dacas commercial correspondent in Mexico City, for example, to 
reveal the names of potential purchasers for steel, thereby reserving 
for himself possible advantages not shared with the rest of the net-
work); and whether networks socialized not only risk, but also profits, 
functioning in this way as a redistributive mechanism for favors and 
wealth, and if so, to what end. 
Guillermina del Valle Pavóns deeply researched essay analyzes 
the position of the merchants of the Consulado de México faced with 
the initial phases of trade liberalization in the American realms of the 
Spanish Empire, specifically using the case of Venezuelan and Ecua-
dorian cacao as an example, at about the same time that Tomás Ruiz 
de Apodaca was building up his commercial enterprise. She is cer-
tainly dealing with small, coherent groups of merchants, but for rea-
sons I hope to make clear in the final section of this essay, and which 
Bernd Hausberger suggests in his chapter, the question arises as to 
whether the consulados really constituted networks in the more re-
stricted sense of the concept, as opposed to formalized institutions that 
shared some of the characteristics of networks. Whatever the case, she 
shows clearly how the Consulado functioned as a formal corporation 
with some of the attributes of a network, chief among these privileged 
access to information that could give its participating members an 
advantage in the market against non-group actors. The Consulado also 
sent its agents, in the person of junior family members or paisanos, to 
Guayaquil and Lima to facilitate its members dealings in the cacao 
trade. But the employee status of these men (we see the same thing in 
Eric Van Young 298
Álvarezs treatment of the Portobelo trade) throws into question their 
designation as members of a network, since the asymmetry between 
them and their employers imposed limits on their ability to reciprocate 
services. Furthermore, her work suggests the strong tendency of net-
works to maintain themselves over time. If networks expand too much 
their boundaries become excessively porous and they lose cohesion. 
Del Valles essay raises several other interesting issues: about the 
distinction between networks specifically and personal relationships 
more generally; about networks and proximity to government; and 
about privileged information that networks may gather outside the 
dealings of the market (i.e., from government sources). Networks may 
share in all of these elements, but all of these together do not necessar-
ily make up a network. 
Finally, Clara Elena Suárez Argüellos interesting treatment of the 
bankruptcy of Pedro de Vértizs business in 1802  an enterprise per-
haps too big to fail (which has an unpleasant contemporary reso-
nance) but that nonetheless did fail  and the ripples it sent throughout 
the economy of New Spain illustrates well her point that a commercial 
failure may provide great insight into normal business practice (in 
much the same way, I would note, that criminal records may illumi-
nate normal life). She writes of a dense net of individuals affected 
by the bankruptcy, and the widespread ruin that engulfed many people 
as a result of the collapse. Certainly the bonds of family and paisanaje 
were essential in these relationships, but one questions if this was in 
fact a network. 
 
2. The Concept of the Social Network 
Although the authors whose essays I have just discussed illustrated the 
nature of social networks and their relationship to commerce in the 
early modern Iberian Atlantic world primarily from an empirical point 
of view, there are some general conclusions to be drawn from their 
work. Let me begin my general discussion by citing a brief formal 
definition of the network concept drawn from the individual essay of 
volume co-editor Bernd Hausberger. In his words, the concept of the 
network serves to describir la asociación informal de un grupo de 
personas basada en relaciones de confianza y en un intercambio conti-
nuo de servicios o favores dentro de un sistema de reciprocidad. This 
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definition mentions most of the elements  informality, relations of 
trust, exchange, and reciprocity  upon which my own discussion is 
based. 
The networks described by all the authors presumably came into 
being among merchants to keep the costs of information down and its 
reliability up, to lower opportunity costs in the process (that is, to help 
them make optimizing choices regarding investment), and to socialize 
risk (to spread or share it among participating parties) to some extent 
within the commercial network itself. Almost all historians of the pe-
riod 1500-1800 have encountered such social networks in one form or 
another, sometimes in the remotest corners of the Iberian world. Al-
though they were by no means unique to Spanish and Portuguese trad-
ers, they seem to have been part of their DNA  genetically encoded 
into the thinking and practices of Iberians as they ventured out across 
the great maritime spaces of the world and the lands they touched. In 
addition to reducing opportunity costs, to keeping the costs of infor-
mation down and its reliability as high as possible, and of socializing 
risk within the group embraced by the social network, there are a 
number of other functions of the social network that I will allude to in 
a moment.  
Most of the papers in this volume (and in the recent volume edited 
by del Valle and Ibarra) state explicitly or implicitly that networks 
associated with trading activities came into being to compensate for a 
series of absences. The absence of reliable information was related in 
a circular fashion to the stickiness of markets: poor information about 
prices and supplies often kept the relations between buyers and sellers 
disequilibrated, while market transactions themselves could generate 
information about relative demand that was not necessarily reliable. 
The relative absence (scarcity) of cash could inhibit large-scale com-
mercial transactions and necessitated credit relationships themselves 
impossible in the absence of social networks (Carlos Álvarez deals 
with this in his essay). States that were weak in some respects, and 
whose authority deteriorated with increasing distance from the me-
tropolis (much as a radio signal or the force of a magnetic field de-
creases with distance from the source), could neither assure rules of 
property that they themselves would honor, let alone enforce among 
third parties, nor guarantee the free functioning of markets. Regarding 
this last point, for example, in their recent work on the mercury trade 
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between Europe and the New World, Pieper and Lesiak have noted 
that private merchants acted as agents for the miners, as contractors, 
and as bankers in the face of a much reduced state administrative ca-
pacity; in other words, in an institutional vacuum that in other histori-
cal circumstances might come to be filled by social groupings such as 
the Sicilian Mafia (Pieper/Lesiak 2007: 19-40). Hausberger has made 
the point that difficult means of communication gave birth to the 
prevalence of social networks, compensatory mechanisms for the 
great distances between buyers and sellers. If this be so (and I see no 
reason to doubt it), then one might expect that as the speed of informa-
tion transmission became faster, as accessibility and reliability in-
creased, and as the friction of distance (and with it leakage out of 
the system and the costs of transport) decreased, the social networks 
that arose to compensate for these problems might diminish in impor-
tance or even wither away entirely. From this point of view the most 
interesting test of how and why social networks functioned in facilitat-
ing commerce would probably be to look at them in a more informa-
tion-rich environment, after the advent of the telegraph and more rapid 
trans-oceanic and rail shipping in the nineteenth century. One would 
then be able to see how social networks morphed or adapted to the 
new conditions, or changed their functions when the initiating condi-
tions of their existence were filtered out. I suspect that social net-
works, of which one enduring type  indeed, the prototype  was the 
extended family, continued in importance even with improved condi-
tions of communication, transport, and market integration after the 
middle third of the nineteenth century or so. This would suggest that it 
was not inadequate information, the friction of distance, or other fac-
tors by themselves that had given rise to the prevalence of social net-
works in commerce and economic life more generally, but perhaps a 
social imperative with cultural roots, a point to which I will return 
shortly. 
The issue of looking at the functions of social networks in a cross-
temporal context points to the necessity of seeing networks as consti-
tuted over time. This element of temporality, in fact, is taken into ac-
count well enough in several of the essays, while in others there is a 
tendency to look at social networks at any given moment (even an 
extended moment of several years) as reticular arrangements in social 
and/or physical space, neglecting the dimension of time. In other 
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words, they are seen as synchronic rather than diachronic structures, a 
point to which Suárez Argüello briefly alludes in her chapter. If we 
speak of social networks, as most of the authors do either implicitly or 
explicitly, as based on relationships of confidence  of trust  between 
the parties involved, then we must acknowledge that such relation-
ships, whether founded upon forms of friendship, family, common 
geographical origin (paisanaje), religious confession, etc., were con-
stituted over time. There are two elements here, it seems to me, to be 
highlighted. First, there needed to be antecedent contacts or beliefs 
that gave reason to think there was some basis for confidence in the 
first place. I have encountered this, for example, in my own work on 
the grain trade in the region of Guadalajara, in New Spain, at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century. In 1802 the administrator of an 
important wheat-producing hacienda, interested in shipping grain to 
the city of Tepic, near the Pacific coast, wrote to a merchant there that  
even though several people in that town [Tepic] have asked me to sell to 
them on commission, I have confidence only in you; and you should re-
member that Asturians from the town of Llanes should keep on good 
terms with those from Cabrales (Van Young 22006: 73). 
Second, there needed to be repeated (although not necessarily regular 
or continuous) exchanges over time rather than unique, one-time-only 
interactions; that is, a longitudinal aspect. This quality of durability in 
networks points up the risk of confusing transactions with networks: 
networks involved transactions, but even though they may have in-
volved several parties, not all transactions necessarily generated net-
works or grew out of them. 
In addition to the element of temporality in the constitution of so-
cial networks, I would suggest that informality was also a key charac-
teristic. That is to say, networks needed to be based upon complemen-
tarity of interests among the interacting parties, and not on the con-
straints characteristic of institutionalized structures, which would 
impose negative sanctions against a party who wanted to leave the 
network  what we might refer to as the cost of exit. This is basi-
cally a liberal model, based upon the freedom of action of all members 
of a network, and may at first glance appear to be excessively volun-
taristic. Within such a durable, informal, and voluntaristic structure 
there would still be room for contractual relationships recognized as 
valid and binding within a shared economic culture; that is to say, the 
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flexibility of the network was not incompatible with recognized rules 
of the game. From this point of view, Carlos Álvarezs discussion of 
the activities of European merchants and their Panamanian factors 
raises certain doubts as to whether employees could enjoy a suffi-
ciently equal status to function as peers of their principals, since there 
needed to be an element of volunteerism in the relationship to allow 
for the reciprocity (that is, equivalent exchange) correctly emphasized 
by Hausberger as another element in the formal description of such 
networks. Álvarez tells us that  
existen motivos para pensar que una parte importante de los cargadores 
de Sevilla no embarcaban sus mercancías en las flotas solo para vender-
las en Portobelo al llegar las flotas, sino con destino a sus factores en Pa-
namá [...] El verdadero negocio del principal grupo de mercaderes sevi-
llanos consistiría, pues, en surtir el Mercado Americano a través de sus 
factores.  
Álvarez has asked the very interesting question here of whether goods 
sold in Portobelo were traded in an open market or found their way to 
buyers through personal networks. But it is not clear that the use of 
resident factors in Panama indicates that goods were sold through such 
networks rather than through the open mediation of the market. The 
intervention of commercial agents (factors) simply meant that the 
American market was sticky, so that Sevillian merchants, when they 
relied on such men, were adding another step in the selling process.  
A second example of the importance of informality in the func-
tioning of networks is raised by Antonio Ibarras discussion of the late 
eighteenth-century Guadalajara consulado in another volume, and by 
Guillermina del Valle Pavóns paper in this one (Ibarra 2007). The 
question is whether such a formalized organization can be called a 
network, exactly, although it certainly had the reticular structure of 
less formal redes. These formalized entities had their constituted au-
thorities, legal codes, rules of entry, rotations in office, and so forth. 
Their evolution from less formal structures of exchange seems to have 
borne certain similarities, conceptually, to the Weberian institutionali-
zation of charismatic authority in personalistic political regimes. Con-
sulados established rules for inclusion and exclusion of members (al-
though allowing for a certain porosity), and their boundaries were not 
only clearly delimited, but policed, as well. If we think of social net-
works as needing to be more flexible and ad hoc in character, then 
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despite their reticular form the consulados might actually be thought 
of as anti-networks. This is, perhaps, a counter-intuitive conclusion, 
but it grows logically out of the preceding discussion and is at least 
worth thinking about. 
Early modern mercantile networks, as several of the papers dem-
onstrate, were glued together by more than just instrumentalist con-
cerns about information, markets, and credit. They were themselves 
both embedded within, and expressions of, certain cultural assump-
tions about how people dealt with each other, and about how the so-
cial world was constituted. Aside from the interesting remarks in sev-
eral of the papers about diasporic communities, Costa and Rocha, in 
their study of merchants and Brazilian gold, raise the fascinating issue 
of the incommensurability of business practices and business culture 
between the Portuguese and Northern Europeans. They do not explic-
itly raise the question of what sort of transaction costs this would have 
entailed, but perhaps it is worth considering. As I have noted above, 
they point out that the English perception was that the Portuguese 
merchants liked to talk with one another while the English wanted to 
get down to business in the narrower sense. They discuss Englishness 
as a confidence-inducing quality among English merchants, and the 
value of trust and reputation between individuals. They therefore im-
ply that trust had not only to do with adherence to the same rules of 
the game and with personal reputation, but also with in-group/out-
group relationships  in other words, with boundaries and exclusions. 
The way affinities drew groups of economic actors together so that 
they could actualize their common business interests is emphasized by 
Pieper and Lesiak in their essay in the Ibarra-del Valle volume about 
Atlantic mercantile redes during the seventeenth century. They speak 
of the way diasporic communities operated, among them Greeks and 
Jews, implying that the cohesion of ethnic and/or religious identity 
was served by such trade-based networks. The more conventional 
interpretation, of course, would be that such affinities and commonal-
ities reduced risk, rather than that reduced risk levels fostered com-
munity. Could it be that the construction of community was in some 
cases the paramount Good, and that the exchange of material goods 
across time and space was a secondary goal, furnishing a sort of pre-
text for the formation and consolidation of community? The truth is 
that the relationship was probably a circular one, but the psycho-social 
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elements in such networks are often neglected, to the impoverishment, 
I think, of the model-building of how they functioned. 
Let me now turn to a discussion of some other points relating to 
social networks and commerce in the early modern Iberian Atlantic. 
To establish some basic elements of a definition of the concept of the 
social network, let me cite the entry on network analysis in the In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008, V: 475-477, 
477-479): 
A social network is any articulated pattern of connections in the social 
relations of individuals, groups, and other collectivities. Social networks 
include friendship and kinship networks, communication networks, sci-
entific citation networks, and policy-maker networks. 
The concept of the network developed primarily in social anthropol-
ogy to describe social relations in small societies and groups, and 
arose from the idea of a web of social relations and actions inter-
woven through such connections. An important recent theoretical 
refinement has been made by the American sociologist Mark Grano-
vetter, who writes of strong ties (bonds) in such reticular arrange-
ments, as presumably we would see in well-established networks, and 
in very formalized ones such as consulados; these he contrasts to 
weak ties  more ad hoc, transitory, casual, and so forth (Granovetter 
1973). In the case of the Iberian colonial world, strong ties would have 
been the most efficacious given the volatile and unpredictable nature 
of market structures, and the lack of reliable information and of ways 
to verify it. All this is to say that in modern societies advanced forms 
of technology, and markets that are highly integrated (that is, that 
share in the same information) and socially deep (that include the ma-
jority of the population) can sustain weaker ties at the level of the 
individual because they provide information-rich environments in 
which individual actors function. In ancien régime societies, on the 
other hand, even where they were weaker and more voluntaristic than 
formal structures such as trading guilds, social networks performed 
the same functions that modern integrated markets and forms of com-
munication technology now perform. It is interesting to note, further-
more, that although the literature on social network analysis in 
the social sciences allows theoretical space for hierarchical networks  
 that is, for relations of dominance and formal authority within net-
works  it tends to emphasize horizontal relations, common interest, 
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and voluntarism in the formation and maintenance of social networks. 
This suggests that relations between employees and their bosses fit 
uneasily, if at all, within the concept of the social network, because by 
definition they exclude (or at least minimize) the possibilities for re-
ciprocity  that is, symmetrical exchange  among peers, which is one 
of the important criteria for the existence of a network.  
Still more important is the common inclusion of kinship as one of 
several bases for network formation (along with fictive kinship, com-
mon geographic origin, religion, and so forth). Several of the essays in 
this volume emphasize this, and it has been noted elsewhere, as well. 
In their introduction to Redes sociales e instituciones comerciales, for 
example, editors del Valle and Ibarra assert that  
los sistemas de relaciones en cuestión [social networks in the early mod-
ern period] fortalecieron y consolidaron negocios e instituciones mercan-
tiles [y] dieron cohesión a los grupos familiares [...] (Ibarra/Valle Pavón 
2007: 8).  
This is an interesting formulation, since one might have assumed that 
it was family groups that fortified, consolidated, and lent cohesion to 
businesses and commercial institutions. Even acknowledging that the 
relationship must be circular, it is logical to assume that families were 
ontologically and sociologically prior to commerce. Some authors in 
the present volume, in fact, and in the recent volume coordinated by 
del Valle and Ibarra imply, where they do not explicitly state, that 
maintenance of some sort of extended family group was the primary 
object of a whole range of commercial activities, and economic opti-
mization the secondary one. Let me cite as an example in that collec-
tion the essay of María Teresa Huerta (although the essays of María 
Concepción Gavira Márquez, Guillermina del Valle Pavón, and Clara 
Elena Suárez Argüello deal with the same issue), which discusses the 
practices of mercaderes de plata in the northern areas of New Spain in 
the seventeenth century (Gavira Márquez 2007; Valle Pavón 2007; 
Suárez Argüello 2007). Her description of the networks of these silver 
merchants  economic, political, and family networks  raises the 
question of whether they were trying to achieve seigneurial ends (that 
is, elevated social status and enduring family prestige) through capital-
ist means. From this point of view, we need to ask what the antecedent 
dispositions of economic choices were; that is, what were the motives 
for various sorts of economic activity? Was commercial involvement 
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the reason for the networks, or was the opposite the case  was the 
social elevation and maintenance of family networks the object of 
commercial activity?5 Huertas essay suggests that the strategy of 
silver merchants was to reproduce the capital generated by families 
and commercial enterprises  but could the strategy not have been 
exactly the reverse: to reproduce the family through the mechanism of 
commercial exchange? From these considerations the question arises 
as to who is the real historical actor in these circumstances, the indi-
vidual or the network? This query leads us in turn toward models of 
distributed intelligence, and even as far as the organized societies of 
insects as described by E.O. Wilson in his studies of ant colonies  
perhaps an extreme extension of my argument here, but one that might 
frame an interesting discussion. 
To conclude this commentary I would like to suggest some key 
points that appear to me to be central to the effort of defining what a 
social network is, or at least what it was in the early modern era. I 
want to emphasize again that I am not presenting a formal model, but 
only some elements for thinking about networks. It may be, in fact, 
that as a first approximation to a definition of social networks these 
elements are excessively rigid and over-specified. Here are nine crite-
ria, nonetheless, that appear to me useful in describing such networks 
in this historical context: 
1. For us to call a social arrangement a network it must be marked by 
durability; that is, it must persist over time since the relationships 
of confidence on which it is based are constituted by repeated ex-
perience and established practices. This would distinguish net-
works from transactions, even those involving a large number of 
people or groups. 
2. The participants in a social network may not be equal insofar as 
their status, power, or resources are concerned, but they are capa-
ble of entering into exchanges in which both parties to the ex-
change give something and receive something, although the rela-
tive value of the goods and/or services given/received may be 
asymmetrical. In other words, there is reciprocity. 
                                                     
5  At this point we enter the interesting territory between economic history and 
cultural history; for some thoughts on this relationship, see Van Young (in press). 
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3. The principal dimension in which social networks function must 
be the horizontal one  that is to say, exchanges must take place 
among individuals who are more or less peers, which assures the 
previous characteristic of social networks, their reciprocity. 
4. Social networks must be voluntary in the sense that actors can 
enter into the network more or less according to their calculations 
of their own interests, whether or not rational or optimizing in the 
economic sense. 
5. Social networks must be marked by informality, and institutional-
ized only weakly or not at all; the costs or penalties for exit must 
be very low or nil.6 
6. Such networks must be constituted at least of two elements: inter-
est and economic exchange as such (that is, the commercial ele-
ment in this case); and another form of social relation, be it friend-
ship, kinship, micro-patriotism (paisanaje), religious affiliation, or 
common membership in an organization without immediate and 
overt economic importance, such as a cofradía or a political entity 
(e.g., an ayuntamiento). And we may also suppose that if there is 
more than one form of extra-economic social relationship in-
volved, the network will be that much stronger, the information 
transmitted within it that much more reliable, the entry and exit 
costs higher, and so forth. 
7. Networks should have powerful nodes  points of high traffic or 
concentration of power. In the terms employed by those scholars 
who study such networks, in other words, there must be central ac-
tors (traffic cops) to direct flows of information, capital, trade-
ables, and people. 
8. Such social networks should have more or less stable rules of 
property and contractual obligation, within an economic culture 
shared by the members of the network. 
9. Networks should be subjectively recognizable to their members. 
The network and its structure, in other words, should constitute an 
emic domain as much as an etic one, coherent as both actors and 
observers categories. 
                                                     
6  I confess to a certain doubt on this point, precisely because of the case of consu-
lados, which appear intuitively to be networks even though they are formalized. 
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I do not pretend that all these criteria are present in all cases where 
social networks facilitated commercial exchange. The points I have 
made here in response to these fine essays are only suggestions to 
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